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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I examine the life and times of Adolf A. Berle Jr.,
perhaps the most influential scholar in the field of corporate governance.
Specifically, I examine his contribution in light of the technological and
institutional changes that occurred in the late nineteenth century—changes
that were germane to his thinking and understanding of corporate
governance. I argue that, despite his perspicacity, he failed to appreciate
the changing role of corporate officers—that is, from that of fiduciary
agent to that of visionary, founder, and essential element in corporate
success. Put differently, in the early twentieth century, the key asset in the
large, modern corporation was its officers’ ability to manage and control
several large-scale, vertically integrated lines of business. This paper will
show that this was reflected in the composition of the Board in the postWWII period where officers dominated and in corporate control in
general.
INTRODUCTION
The late nineteenth century to early twentieth century was a period
of extraordinary technological and institutional change in America. Largescale, countrywide firms had emerged and were in the process of crowding
out small-scale, local/regional ones. Similarly, vertically integrated value
chains were replacing traditional small-scale, atomistic production units.
Combined, these two developments prompted a political and intellectual
upheaval as the founding principles of the American experience were
under siege. Competitive markets where no one consumer or producer
yielded any power were being replaced by concentrated markets. These
new, concentrated markets possessed considerable market power, whether
they chose to exercise it or not. A good example is Standard Oil, which
controlled ninety-five percent of the market at its zenith, while passing
substantial cost savings on to consumers in the form of lower prices. A
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similar scenario played itself out with the Ford Motor Company, which
held eighty-five percent of the market yet offered automobiles at the
historically low price of $300.00.
These changes begged a response on the part of the nation’s
intellectual elite. How would the economics profession respond? How
would the legal profession respond? The stakes were high for a number of
reasons. For example, the concentration of power that had been the bane
of Western political, legal, and economic thought had nonetheless
provided the post-WWII consumer with a standard of living that was
without precedent. Whatever the nation’s new captains of industry were
doing, the fact remained that the standard of living was on the rise, more
so than any other time in the nation’s history—and indeed in the history
of the Western world.
In this paper, I examine Adolf A. Berle Jr.’s role and contribution to
this monumental task—that is, of understanding and coming to terms with
these changes. I argue that, while his contribution was pathbreaking, it was
flawed, in large measure due to his inability to understand and appreciate
the associated technological change, which we show had important
implications for the question of property within the modern corporation.
The paper is organized as follows: I begin by reviewing the technological
and institutional changes that defined the Second Industrial Revolution,
including the implications of these changes for governance. This is then
followed by a presentation and critique of Adolf A. Berle Jr. and his coauthor Gardiner Means’s contributions.
I. PRE- AND POST-SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
TECHNOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONS
The late nineteenth century witnessed cataclysmic change in firm and
industry structure in the United States. According to Alfred D. Chandler,
this came in response to a number of key developments, including the
Louisiana Purchase in 1803, the introduction of high-quality, affordable
steel (due to the Bessemer Process), the opening up of the Western frontier
to settlement, and the unprecedented growth of the railroad. Taken
together, these developments ushered in a number of defining changes in
the conduct of business. Notable among these were (1) the introduction of
high-throughput material processes, (2) the integration under one roof of
most/all of the links in value chains, and (3) the downstream integration
into marketing, finance, and distribution.1 Table 1 lists these changes,
providing pre and post comparisons. We see, for example, that the small,
1. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 245, 259, 285–376 (1977).
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disparate, independent production units of yore were replaced by largescale, high-throughput vertically integrated units. On-site hydro- and
steam-power was being replaced by electric power. According to Warren
Devine and others,2 this was achieved in two phases: electric motors
initially powering the existing belting and shafting drive technology and,
in the early twentieth century, the introduction of electric unit drive. Firms
went from generating power on-site to purchasing it from large-scale
public utilities. Markets that had been local or regional in nature gave way
to national ones. However, the most important of these changes, insofar as
the current paper is concerned, was the fact that broadly defined
technology (process and product) was no longer a free good but rather was
proprietary in nature, embodied in the firm’s officers and managers.3 A
good example is Henry Ford and his team of upper-level managers and
officers, who, over a period of a decade, introduced changes that would
redefine not only the automobile industry but also the manufacturing
sectors of the U.S. and world economies.4 Theoretically speaking,
management became a new input—distinct from nineteenth century
business administration—as witnessed by the introduction of management
courses in university-level curricula.5 Firm officers (CEO, CFO, COO)
introduced new products, new processes, and new marketing strategies.6
Edward Prescott and Michael Visscher referred to this as the firm’s
organization capital, while more recently, David Teece referred to this as
“dynamic capabilities.”7 The end result was a revolution of sorts in the
conduct and performance of industry, known as the Second Industrial
Revolution and/or modernity.

2. See BERNARD C. BEAUDREAU, MASS PRODUCTION, THE STOCK MARKET CRASH, AND THE
GREAT DEPRESSION: THE MACROECONOMICS OF ELECTRIFICATION 4–8 (1996); Warren D. Devine
Jr., Electrified Mechanical Drive: The Historical Power Distribution Revolution, in ELECTRICITY IN
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: AGENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 21, 29–34 (Sam H. Schurr, Calin
C. Burwell, Warren D. Devine, Jr. & Sidney Sonenblum eds., 1990).
3. See generally Bernard C. Beaudreau, Corporate Control: Towards a Realistic Theory, 4 CAN.
INV. REV. 47 (1991); Edward Prescott & Michael Visscher, Organization Capital, 88 J. POL. ECON.
446 (1980); David J. Teece, A Dynamic Capabilities-Based Entrepreneurial Theory of the
Multinational Enterprise, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 8 (2014).
4. These included the power-driven assembly line and vertical upstream and downstream
integration, the creation of a distribution network (dealers), and finance, among others.
5. One could argue that this marked the de facto beginning of the knowledge economy.
6. Interestingly, the 1910s and 1920s witnessed the emergence of a similar view, namely of
management as a distinct factor input. See, e.g., HENRY C. METCALF, BUSINESS MANAGEMENT AS A
PROFESSION (1927).
7. Michael Porter referred to it as dynamic/sustained competitive advantage or the ability to
sustain the firm’s advantage over the long haul via the judicious use of innovation both at the product
and process levels.
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Table 1: Pre- and Post-Second Industrial Revolution Characteristics
Pre
Small, disparate, non-integrated units
Steam/water powered material processes
Energy generated on-site
Known/free technology
Standardized goods
Markets were local/regional

Post
Large, high-throughput vertically integrated units
Electric-powered material processes (EUD)
Energy purchased from public utilities
Technology was not free
Goods were differentiated (product design, marketing)
Markets were national

Nathan Rosenberg, in his comments on Robert Hessen’s 1983 The
Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal, described
organization capital in the following terms:
To bring us back full circle to Berle and Means, let me close by
calling attention to one specific aspect of the organizational
revolution wrought by the modern corporation. In advanced
industrial economies, corporations bring together a wide range of
professional skills and highly specialized knowledge. This includes
such things as commercial knowledge relating to the specific
requirements of numerous submarkets, complex technological
knowledge involving the performance characteristics of specific
classes of machinery, and scientific knowledge that is increasingly
essential in forming judgments concerning the direction of future
research or new product development. A successful business
organization is one that manages somehow to coordinate and to
exploit such highly specialized bodies of knowledge and expertise in
a commercial context. Quite independent of considerations
respecting size of firm and the diffusion of ownership, this
consideration, by itself, had already rendered totally impracticable,
by 1930, the unity of ownership and control.8

These developments had important implications for the corporate
power and control landscape in general.
The role of physical capital within organizations had undergone a
fundamental change, going from one consisting of material process-based
tools and energy-related tools (hydro/steam) to only the former. The latter
was no longer a factor input provided by shareholders as power would now
be purchased from public utilities. As such, the capital input was reduced

8. Nathan Rosenberg, Comments on Robert Hessen, “The Modern Corporation and Private
Property: A Reappraisal,” 26 J. L. & ECON. 291, 296 (1983).
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to tools and structures—both passive, non-physically productive inputs.9
Instead, that title went to organization capital, corporate officers, and
upper-level management who were largely responsible for the firm’s
success (product development, process development, vertical integration,
marketing, etc.). In short, those now responsible for the creation of value.
A. Factor Inputs and Bargaining Power:
Pre- and Post-Second Industrial Revolution
In this section, we examine the question of corporate control, or
control in general, from the point of view of bargaining power.10 The latter
will be defined in terms of (1) a factor input’s physical contribution to the
creation of wealth/value and (2) scarcity. Specifically, the greater a
factor’s contribution to wealth/value, the greater its bargaining power. For
example, if I happen to be (or own) the prime factor input contributing the
most to overall wealth/value, then it stands to reason that I would have
more bargaining power and hence more control. In other words, the scarcer
a factor, the greater its bargaining power. According to neoclassical
production theory, wealth is an increasing function of labor and capital,
both of which are considered to be physically productive. That is, both
contribute physically to overall output/wealth. However, in Energy and
Organization: Growth and Distribution Reexamined, Bernard Beaudreau
argued that such a view of production was untenable as it violates the laws
of physics.11 In its place, he proposed the energy-organization approach,
according to which wealth/value was an increasing function of two
universal factor inputs, namely broadly defined energy and broadly
defined organization, with the former being physically productive and the
latter defining the framework in which energy transforms raw materials
and semi-finished goods.12 The key point, as far as we are concerned, is

9. In Energy and Organization: Growth and Distribution Reexamined, I referred to tools and
structures as an organizational input, providing the physical framework in which the energy input
creates value—that is, transforms inputs. As such, they are a necessary part of material processes but
not physically productive per se. BERNARD C. BEAUDREAU, ENERGY AND ORGANIZATION: GROWTH
AND DISTRIBUTION REEXAMINED 142 (1998).
10. Interestingly—and ironically—Berle made a similar argument in How Labor Could Control,
arguing that the “shares” of corporations should be distributed “[a]ccording to the fairest appraisal of
the value of the employee-stockholder’s services.” In short, each worker would be given ownership
and control in proportion to his contribution to the firm. Unfortunately, he stopped short of provided
a detailed account of workers’ and capital’s “contribution” to the firm. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., How
Labor Could Control, 28 NEW REPUBLIC 37, 38 (1921).
11. BEAUDREAU, supra note 9, at 87. Capital or tools are not physically productive, not being a
source of energy. The same applies to labor, which is largely a supervisory input, making energy the
only factor capable of doing work, and hence capable of being physically productive. See id.
12. The Energy-Organization is consistent with Edward O. Wilson’s notion of “consilience” in
the sense that it is consistent with approaches to material processes found in the related fields of
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the resulting view/role of capital (simple/complex tools and structures) in
production as not being physically productive and not being a source of
energy. Put differently, capital is a passive input whose constituent tools
provide mechanical advantage, but it is not physically productive.13 Fastforward to the Second Industrial Revolution and the underlying changes.
Previously, small-scale firms owned and controlled the source of energy
(thermal/hydro); afterwards, energy was, for the most part, purchased from
large-scale private and public utilities.14 Table 2 lists the key differences
between the “old” and “new” economy. For example, in the old economy
the owners of capital provided the energy input; in the new economy, it
was purchased. As such, none of the on-site factors were physically
productive. Second, and perhaps more importantly, in the old economy,
technology (process and product) was free; however, in the new economy,
it was proprietary since the firm’s officers (entrepreneurs/managers)
developed it. A good example is Apple’s Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs,
who together developed the original Macintosh PC. In this paper, we
maintain that these changes hold the key to understanding the evolution of
corporate governance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Table 2: Fundamental Changes in Twentieth Century
Material Processes
Old
Shareholders controlled energy input
Production technique free
Capital, not physically productive
Labor, a supervisory input

New
Energy purchased
Production technique was proprietary
(production technique, marketing, product line)
Capital, not physically productive
Labor, a supervisory input

B. Implications for Corporate Governance
The changing face of production in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, outlined by Alfred D. Chandler, had a profound
impact on corporate governance. Specifically, the introduction of a new
process engineering, biology, and applied physics. See EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE
UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 8–14 (1998).
13. Mechanical advantage is defined as a measure of the force amplification achieved by using
a tool, mechanical device, or machine system. The device preserves the input power and simply trades
off forces against movement to obtain a desired amplification in the output force. The model for this
is the law of the lever. Machine components designed to manage forces and movement in this way are
called mechanisms. An ideal mechanism transmits power without adding to or subtracting from it.
This means the ideal mechanism does not include a power source, is frictionless, and is constructed
from rigid bodies that do not deflect or wear. The performance of a real system relative to this ideal is
expressed in terms of efficiency factors that take into account departures from the ideal.
14. See BEAUDREAU, supra note 2, at 105–11; Devine, supra note 2, at 21.
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form of capital, namely organization capital, along with the
marginalization of traditional capital (from providers of energy and
tools/structures to simply providers of passive, non-physically productive
tools/structures) changed the face of control within the firm. These
changes were reflected in virtually all aspects of the firm, including the
composition of the board. From that point on, corporate officers occupied
an increasingly important place on the board. They appeared to usurp
control and power from shareholders when, in fact, they were simply
exercising their legal right over what had become the key factor input and
the key source of value creation: organization capital.
The post-WWII period witnessed boards that were, for the most part,
dominated by insiders, consisting most often of firms’ senior officers
(CEO, CFO, COO). The CEO often wore two hats: chief officer and chair
of the board. To observers on the political left, this was seen as evidence
of the Berle–Means thesis. I maintain that it simply reflected the increased
importance of organizational capital, which manifested itself in greater
bargaining power. In short, the financial success of the firm depended on
the officers’ acumen, vision, and ability to invent, and reinvent, processes
and products.
However, board composition changed in the 1990s and 2000s in
response to the productivity slowdown when blame was assigned—at least
in part—to the managerial class and its purported lack of accountability.
This led to legislation intended to provide more transparency and more
accountability, including the proposed Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of
2009 and The Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009, which were based
largely on the Berle–Means critique.15 While intended to increase
accountability with the hope of improving the long-term performance of
corporations and ultimately economic growth, the data show no
discernable increase in growth. Some have attributed this to the increased
presence of institutional investors and hedge-fund representatives on
corporate boards. According to Martin Lipton, this has had the perverse
effect of putting the emphasis on short-run returns on investment (known
a short-termism) at the expense of long-term goals.16 It is my view that the
trend towards outsider-dominated boards is potentially counterproductive
for a number of other reasons, including the knowledge asymmetry
referred to earlier. For a board to be effective, its members must be as, if
15. It bears reminding that neither of these became law, having been defeated in Congress. See
Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009); Shareholder Empowerment Act
of 2009, H.R. 2861, 111th Cong. (2009).
16. See, e.g., Martin Lipton et al., Corporate Governance: The New Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/11/
corporate-governance-the-new-paradigm/ [https://perma.cc/7YFV-2XPP].
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not more, qualified as the firm’s officers. Anything short of this could, and
would, impede the firm’s growth and success.
C. Shareholders and the Ability to Control/Govern
Since The Modern Corporation and Private Property (MCPP), it is
generally argued/held that the right to control and govern the firm has been
usurped by pirate-like managers at the expense of the shareholders. I
maintain that while it is true that managers gained control of the firm, the
underlying reasons were not malevolent but rather were simply a reflection
of the new reality described above. In fact, one could go as far as to argue
that this came about by default. Put differently, shareholders (i.e., those
with claims to tools and structures) or their agents could not possibly
control the firm either in their own interest (ROI) or in the interest of
society (welfare) for lack of relevant knowledge/information. The
associated matrix of decisions involved in the new economy of the time
(i.e., at the turn of the century) was simply beyond their comprehension,
which made it impossible for them to de facto control the firm.17 Effective
management—and hence control—is information- and experienceintensive, which puts it outside and beyond the reach of the average
representative shareholder. No better proof of this is provided by the
literature on the composition of the board of directors and its effect on firm
performance. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was felt that corporate
performance could be improved by increasing the presence of outside
board managers. The evidence, however, showed that in many cases the
ROA and Tobin’s Q actually fell as a result. In the best-case scenario, there
was no effect. This provides corroborative evidence that the effective
management of today’s (and yesterday’s) modern corporations is highly
information- and experience-intensive, and more importantly, frequently
beyond the reach of shareholders or outsiders.18 Capital in new-economy
firms was reduced to providing non-physically productive tools. Contrast
this with capital in old-economy firms that provided, in addition to tools,
the only physically productive factor input: power (hydraulic, steam, etc.).
Organization capital in the new economy consisted of the corporate
visionaries of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and their
acolytes—that is, the personnel that provided logistical, financial,
engineering, and other forms of services/knowledge. Put differently, these
17. This question was and is never raised. That this remains the case is, in my view, a reflection
of the archaic view of the firm that underlies the literature, namely that of the perfectly competitive
firm where the managers choose the profit-maximizing level of output—in short, choosing a point on
a bivariate profit function.
18. Organization capital in the old economy consisted of individuals capable of executing wellknown and well-worn production schedules—what is referred to as business administration.
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individuals were complementary inputs to the founders/visionaries of the
corporation. Table 3 lists a number of these visionaries and founders
whose contributions collectively ushered in the Second Industrial
Revolution.19
Table 3: Visionaries of Early Twentieth Century Modernity
Henry Ford of Ford Motor
Thomas Edison of General Electric
Gerald Swope of General Electric
John Francis Queeny of Monsanto
George Westinghouse of Westinghouse
William Crapo Durant of General Motors
John Rockefeller of Standard Oil
Pierre-Samuel Dupont de Nemours of Dupont

II. ADOLF A. BERLE JR.’S INTELLECTUAL CONTRIBUTION
Born and raised in Boston, Massachusetts, Adolf A. Berle Jr. was a
product of his time. After completing both an undergraduate and graduate
degree in history at Harvard, he went on to study law at Harvard Law
School, graduating with a law degree at age twenty-one. In this section, I
argue that these elements are important to understanding his approach to
the issues of the day, specifically that of corporate control and public
policy. Specifically, being from Massachusetts and a historian at heart, he
had a model of business that was fashioned in large measure by his
environment. For example, the firms in the nearby industrial Boston
suburb of Cambridge, Massachusetts, like those in virtually all New
England company towns, were small in scale and powered by waterpower,
steam, or both, and they were owner-operated and managed—in short,
Chandler-style “old-economy” firms.
I maintain that this came to define his prototypical view (e.g., his set
point) and understanding of the firm, namely as being controlled by its
owners—that is, the owners of capital. As the latter included the power
generation and transmission equipment, it followed that control resided in
what was by far the most important factor input, namely the
owner/operator/shareholder. Put differently, shareholders/owners
exercised de facto and de jure control of the firm.
By the 1920s, considerable shade had been cast on this almost
folkloric view of the firm as large, vertically integrated national firms had
19. For more on the visionaries that collectively ushered in the Second Industrial Revolution, see
generally CHANDLER, supra note 1.
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come to dominate the industrial landscape.20 As pointed out above, these
firms differed fundamentally from their nineteenth century counterparts,
with the most important difference being the presence of significant
organization capital. In these firms, the key factor input was managerial
ability because capital had been reduced to what was essentially a passive
factor input (tools and structures). Bargaining power, it follows, would
have shifted from the owners of physical capital to the owners of
organization capital. It was in such a context that Berle, with the assistance
of economist Gardiner Means, waded into the question of corporate
control, examining the changes thrust upon corporate America against
what was, essentially, a nineteenth-century understanding of control and
welfare. Specifically, in keeping with both the economic and legal
traditions of his day, they set out to understand these changes and their
implications for welfare. Table 4 presents a non-exhaustive list of their
findings, both micro and macro in nature. By far, the most important of
these was the separation of ownership from control. In short, shareholders,
the owners of the physical assets of the firm, no longer controlled what
was their property, thus violating basic property law.21 However, the
breadth of their endeavors extended well beyond the question of
usurpation. For example, there was the question of the welfare
implications of manager-controlled firms. Would they maximize profits in
the interest of society? The free market system, as formalized in standard
economic theory, is founded on two behavioral principles, namely utility
maximization and profit maximization. If either of these is violated, then
the much-celebrated welfare effects/benefits of a market-based system can
no longer be invoked/defended.22 A good example of this is the working
of the price system in downturns, specifically the self-regulating nature of
markets. In the face of excess supply, prices fall, thus re-equilibrating the
market. However, if firms are not maximizing profits—that is, responding
to incentives—then it is no longer clear that prices will fall in the face of
excess supply. Berle and Means in MCPP—published in the depth of the
Depression—went a long way to confirm the Keynesian notion that the
price system, as outlined in neoclassical theory, was flawed.
While this view was an integral part of MCPP, it was orthogonal to
the view of large firms—and their behavior—found in the various policy
measures introduced by Roosevelt’s National Recovery Administration,
20. See, e.g., id.
21. In short, managers had shirked on their fiduciary duty vis-a-vis shareholders, pursuing nonshareholder consistent goals.
22. The many welfare results and theorems in standard economic theory are premised on profit
maximization and, as such, are violated in its absence. Essentially, if firms fail to maximize profits,
then virtually nothing can be said.

2019]

The Life and Times of Adolf A. Berle Jr.

355

where they were seen as decidedly predatory in nature and hence in need
of being regulated. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Brains Trust, whose
members included Adolf A. Berle Jr., believed that the key to recovery lay
in higher real wages and stable prices. Getting in the way of the latter were
the very corporations described in MCPP, namely the large-scale,
vertically integrated, nation-wide conglomerates that were aggressively
cutting prices. In short, they were accused of predatory aggressive pricechiseling, the result of which was to compromise the financial health of
the more numerous smaller firms, invariably leading to bankruptcy. It was
with this in mind that the Brains Trust proposed the “Codes of Fair
Competition,” which was the instrument through which New Deal policies
would be formalized. Specifically, as the name indicates, each industry
would collectively decide on a minimum price—consistent with the idea
of “fair competition.”
Table 4: Berle and Means’s Major Findings
Micro
− New economy is controlled by 200 large corporations and 385 corporate officers.
− Diluted ownership, diluted control, hijacking.
− Shareholders denied basic property rights—that is, controlling investment.
− Profit maximization gave way to sales/market, share/managerial, and whim/perk
maximization.
− Welfare was compromised (Great Depression).
− Large firms engaged in predatory practices at the expense of small firms.
Macro
− Large corporations did not maximize profits.
− Pursued other interests.
− Did not cut prices in response to excess supply.
− Impinged on the workings of markets.

This illustrates one of the key shortcomings of the MCPP regarding
the question of pricing behavior. Based largely on the writings of Gardiner
Means, it maintained that prices were largely administered and hence set
outside of the market framework. However, administered prices are not
necessarily fixed prices, as witnessed by the aggressive price-cutting
behavior of larger firms.
A. Berle and Means’s Oversights
It is my view that Berle and Means’s overall contribution to the field
of corporate governance suffered from two fundamental oversights:
ignoring the role of organization capital in twentieth century
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conglomerates and failing to provide a theory of the manager-controlled
firm—that is, a more detailed analysis of the large conglomerates
described in Alfred D. Chandler’s The Visible Hand, The Revolution in
American Business. As we have argued, this can be attributed in large
measure to (1) Berle’s formal training in property law and (2) his (and
Gardiner Means’s) view of the role of capital/tools in production. In his
view, the de facto and de jure owners of the firm, the shareholders, should
exercise de facto and de jure control. That this was not the case in the early
twentieth century was seen as a violation of not only the rule of law but
also of the workings of the for-profit market economy.
Table 5: Berle and Means’s Oversights
Micro
− Failed to grasp/appreciate the integral role of organization capital (was not alone as it
failed to appear on the trade, I-O, and micro radars).
− Physical capital (essentially tools) had become secondary in nature, as had the role/place
of its owners.
− Those in power were not property-less (organization capital).
− Shareholders could not effectively control the firm for lack of knowledge (new economy).
Basic oversight owed partly to his legal background in property law and his understanding
of the basic economic model (by now redundant), not to mention the American belief.
− In marketplace democracy many firms, many buyers, no market power.
− He was not alone in his condemnation of the rise of bigness, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt’s
Progressive Party.
Macro
− In the downturn (1929–1932), large corporations were more aggressive cutting prices.
− Large corporations were more likely to maintain wage levels in the downturn (Hoover
and Roosevelt). Many large corporations were founded by visionary entrepreneurs with
liberal values (e.g., Henry Ford). Large corporations were more likely to be unionized
(Galbraith’s countervailing power).

Put differently, both Berle and Means sought to gain insight into the
workings of the early-twentieth-century corporations that had transformed
not only America but the world economy through the lenses of eighteenthcentury law and political economy. For example, in the latter, firm size is
viewed with great suspicion because it connotes market power, which is
considered to be welfare reducing. However, according to the “efficient
structure” view, firm size is a measure of success and is seen to be welfare
increasing.23 Interestingly, from a legal point of view, while they alleged
malfeasance on the part of the two hundred largest corporations, they
23. See generally Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy, 16 J.
L. & ECON. 1 (1973) [hereinafter Demsetz (1973)].
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failed to provide systematic evidence of the injury that corresponding
corporate officers had caused. In the next section, I argue that far from
causing injury, this class of managers increased shareholder wealth/value
more so than in any time in history. While we maintain that Berle and
Means’s contribution suffered from a number of shortcomings, I hasten to
add that they were not alone. For example, as far as organization capital is
concerned, the notion that among a corporation’s assets are the
knowledge/capabilities of its founders/managers/executives is a relatively
recent development. Until the 1960s, only tangible assets (i.e., tools,
structures) were considered as assets/capital. By the 1970s, the view that
large, concentrated firms (like those found in MCPP) were harmful to
consumer and social welfare had been replaced by Harold Demsetz’s
“efficient structure” view, according to which these firms, while extremely
profitable, actually contributed to raising welfare, relative to their smaller
rivals.24
B. Were Berle and Means’s Fears/Misgivings/Doubts Warranted?
One of the overriding themes in both Berle’s and Means’s writings
was the impending doomsday scenarios that were evoked. In their view—
and that of many of their contemporaries, including Joseph A.
Schumpeter—the usurpation of power and control by corporate officers
augured poorly for the future of capitalism. The purported benefits of
profit-maximization would be lost and large-scale inefficiency would be
the final result. Throughout their work, there is an overriding pessimism
and an implicit call to arms, so to speak. With the benefit of hindsight, this
raises the question: Were their fears—shared by a whole generation of
scholars (i.e., shareholder primacy)—warranted? Did they materialize?
Were there grounds for the called-for government intervention?
Unfortunately, the ex-post evidence does not corroborate their fears,
as the post-WWII period witnessed a golden age of sorts, dominated in
large measure by the very large-scale corporations Berle and Means
examined. In fact, these corporate visionaries were largely responsible for
the greatest increase in wealth ever achieved.25 Growth rates in the postWWII period averaged 5% per annum. Shareholder value increased at a
record pace. For example, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average went from a
24. While this view attributed firm success/performance to managerial ability, Demsetz and
others continued to define the firm largely in terms of its shareholders—that is, in terms of its physical
capital (tools and structures). See generally Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly,
in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164 (H.J. Goldschmid, H.M. Mann & J.F.
Weston eds., 1974); Demsetz (1973), supra note 23.
25. See generally ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S.
STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR (2016); Robert J. Gordon, Does the “New Economy”
Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Past?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 49–74 (2000).
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level of 153.6 in January 1945 to a level of 965 in December 1968—a 6.8fold increase. Likewise, the Cowles Commission/S&P index went from
13.49 in January 1945 to 106.48 in December 1968—a 7.89-fold increase.
Wages in manufacturing also increased at record levels. Richard B.
Freeman et al. showed that compensation per man-hour increased at an
annual compound rate of 3.30% from 1947 to 1966, tracking an output per
man-hour growth rate of 3.39%.26 Hence, while concentration may have
been on the rise, and firm officers may have de facto usurped control from
shareholders, the fact remains that overall social welfare increased
throughout this period.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Following the productivity slowdown (mid-1970s), one of the
proposed policy responses was to reform corporate officer remuneration,
putting more emphasis on long-term instruments (e.g., stock options).27
Unfortunately, this has not been, on the whole, successful, as growth rates
have failed to return to their post-WWII levels. Specifically, growth rates
have averaged 1.5% per annum, roughly half of their post-WWII levels.
Nonetheless, in 2013, corporate officer remuneration was as much as
295.9 times that of the average worker, as compared to 1965 when it stood
at 20 times.28
I would argue that this has backfired in the sense that it has attracted
the wrong type of officer. Instead of the visionaries of yore, the managerial
landscape is now populated by MBA-trained corporate officers whose
overriding purpose is to maximize ROI (aka short-termism). In other
words, it has failed to attract or produce the visionaries of yore. Absent
from the managerial landscape today are the Henry Fords, the Thomas
Edisons, and the Gerald Swopes of the early 1900s.
There are important lessons to be learned here. First, in the tradition
of Edward Prescott, Michael Visscher, and David Teece, the modern
corporation’s greatest asset is not its physical assets (tools and structures)
but rather its organization capital. The owners of the former are essential,
but not germane, to the corporation’s success. This, I maintain, is where
26. See Richard B. Freeman, John T. Dunlop & R.F. Schubert, The Evolution of the American
Labor Market, 1948–80, in THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN TRANSITION 349, 352 (Martin Feldstein ed.,
1980).
27. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS
2485 (O. Ashenfelter, R. Layard & D. Card eds., 1999); Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO
Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 123 (2000).
28. See Lawrence Mishel & Alyssa Davis, CEO Pay Continues to Rise as Typical Workers Are
Paid Less, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 12, 2014), https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay-continuesto-rise/ [https://perma.cc/8YNZ-L6ZA].
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Berle and Means erred. Specifically, giving shareholders control of the
200 large corporations contained in their sample would have been counterproductive in light of (1) the important information (dynamic capabilities)
asymmetry that exists and (2) the relative rarity of top-notch organization
capital vis-a-vis physical capital.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Adolf A. Berle Jr. and Gardiner Means’s MCPP was pathbreaking in
its scope and breadth. It raised extremely important and relevant questions.
The corporate world had changed, and the relevant question was how,
why, and what were the consequences?
While it advanced the debate, I have argued that Berle and Means’s
past, education, and reading of these changes prevented them from not
only accurately understanding these far-reaching changes but also from
appreciating the contribution of a new generation of corporate officers to
the growth and progress of the U.S. and world economies. Largely as the
result of the visions and acumen of these officers, America, and indeed the
world, were transformed forever. Growth rates in the post-WWII period
broke all records. Material well-being increased across the board. In fact,
for the last forty years, the World (and the economics profession) has
attempted to recreate this episode in history.29
What was surprising in the case of Adolf A. Berle Jr. is the extent to
which his thinking (and that of Gardiner Means) failed to evolve despite
the corporate performances in the post-WWII period. The 200 large
corporations that were the focus of MCPP performed exceptionally well
in the post-WWII period, making fundamental contributions to the wellbeing and welfare of the United States and the world, raising the question:
why? Why did they fail to acknowledge and, more importantly, integrate
these changes into his (and, indeed, the legal profession’s) thinking?
In this paper, I have pointed to a number of factors, including (1)
their failure to understand the key role visionary managers played in the
Second Industrial Revolution, (2) Berle’s training/background in civil law
where property connotes the notion of control, and (3) the Great
Depression. The first is self-explanatory and, more importantly, not unique
to him. It took the economics profession a half century to acknowledge
that firm size was—or could be—a measure of efficiency rather than one
of malevolent behavior on the part of firm’s officers. Berle’s legal
background, in our view, probably did not help as it is founded on a
statutory definition of the firm. Organization capital, per se, was not even
29. By “recreate this episode,” it should be understood that I mean restoring growth rates to their
post-WWII rates—roughly, 5% per annum on average.
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so much as a consideration. The third factor was the Great Depression,
which catapulted the MCPP into a completely different stratosphere,
elevating its authors and, more importantly, the resulting Berle–Means
hypothesis to its legendary status as one of the foremost important
rationales for market failure.

